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See Pippin (1993, pp.52-56) for discussion on this. Cf. Stern (2013, p.10): “It is certainly the
case that perhaps the greatest challenge to any reading of the Phenomenology is to show how
it can be understood as a coherent and well-ordered work”
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Luft (2013) is an exception, though he doesn’t talk about the above mentioned two questions.
For instance, Stern (2013) and Luft (2013).
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Hyppolite (1979, p. 228) underscores the importance of these chapters: “This is what is most
original in Hegel’s philosophy, the reconciliation of the history of thought with thought itself.”
4
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After the shape of Reason comes the shape of Spirit and its various progressive
manifestations—social, aesthetic, religious, and absolute spirit. What is distinctive here is
that consciousness or the taking up of determinate empirical concepts is no longer an
individual activity but one governed by social norms. For the purposes of my paper, one can
roughly define Spirit as a normatively structured social world, produced and reproduced by
self-conscious subjects. The ultimate aim of the Phenomenology can be taken to be a
demonstration of the dialectic wherein Spirit becomes conscious of itself as Spirit. Robert
Brandom has referred to Spirit as a supersubject.
5
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Like: What actually is the mediator? How exactly does the mediator have an immediate
relation to both the universal and the singular? What does it mean for the singular to unite
with the universal? How is their unison brought about? What constitutes the mediator’s
counsel? etc. I will be assuming answers for some of these questions in my paper, and hope
for my exegesis to shed peripheral light on them.
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See Cr A42/B59 as following from the results of the transcendental aesthetic, and Cr B148
read with B166 as following from the results of the transcendental deduction. Hegel charges
Kant for not being critical enough, for his approach “presupposes a difference between our
own selves and [] cognition” (Ph ¶74) This indictment is especially relevant as Kant’s
assumption of a subject as separate from the perceived object was one key factor that led him
to his radical conclusion.
8 This was Kant’s central insight which Hegel acknowledges. For Kant, self-consciousness (or
the transcendental unity of apperception) is the “supreme” condition of all experience; it is
the primitive I in which the representation of sensible intuition is unified so as to be for one
consciousness. As Kant famously puts it, the “I think” must accompany consciousness of
anything. See Cr A107, A123, B131-32, and B136. The problem, according to Hegel, is that
Kant will eventually conclude from this that we cannot know an object beyond our
representation of it, whereas for Hegel, thought is seen to directly grasp being without
remainder, for it sees the same rationality mirrored in the other. Cf. Stern (2013, p.18).
9 See Ph ¶33: “[pure thinking] consists in giving up the fixity of its self-positing”
This is the “monochrome formalism” of Kant’s that Hegel was dissatisfied with (I talk here
only of its theoretical aspect). He levies this charge at various points in the Phenomenology
(as well as in his other writings: see for instance EL¶41), but see especially Ph ¶15-16, ¶56,
and ¶238. See Guyer (1993) for discussion. For Kant, the transcendental unity of
apperception was only the “vehicle of concepts” (Cr A341), the mere form of any thinking, and
not thought itself. In detaching the assumption of pure self-consciousness as formal, fixed,
and static, and conceiving it to have a rich, dynamic, dialectical movement, Hegel in his own
unique way sought to improve upon the Kantian response to skepticism. See Pippin (1989,
pp.16-41) for an influential interpretation along these lines.
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“Consciousness in its own self provides its own standard, and the investigation will thereby
be a comparison of it with itself” (Ph ¶84). Hegel takes the Phenomenology to be the way in
which natural consciousness is educated by its own experience and thereby transformed. See
also Beiser (2005, pp.156-7) on how this internal standard improves over Kant’s external one.
11 As an example of this process, the shape of Skepticism negates everything, all life and
things, by regarding them to have no independence or reality outside thought. This negating
activity is meant to secure certainty for itself, but this blanket negation sweeps up Skepticism
itself and ends up undermining its own certainty of itself. Skepticism can’t both negate its
changing perceptions and its unchanging self-identity, and thus falls into aporia. This aporia
leads to a new shape of consciousness, the ‘unhappy consciousness’, which unites these two
opposing qualities in one self.
For a general construction of Hegel’s process, see Houlgate (2013, pp. 19-20), EL ¶¶81-82. On
Hegel’s method in some detail, see Forster (1993), Houlgate (2003). The main dialectical aim
is to break down opposition between two seemingly unamiable concepts, so that what arises
is a way forward rather than a simple repudiation.
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See Forster (1993, pp.138-39, 145-49) for a detailed account of necessity in the
Phenomenology.
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Cf. Schacht (1972, 5). Hegel also construes movement as where the difference between
knowledge and truth is steadily cancelled or bridged (Ph ¶805).
13

9

This is similar to what Houlgate (2013, p. 24) terms as ‘macro-transitions’ and ‘microtransitions’.
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Ph ¶87: “for us, what has emerged at the same time emerges as movement and coming-to-

be.”

11

Readers familiar with the Phenomenology will recognize an interpretive difficulty here.
Though it is apparent from the text that Hegel means the progress of consciousness through
its stages in the dialectic to mark a progressive heightening of consciousness’s selfconsciousness, yet Hegel also avers that, “the emergence of the new object [ ] presents itself
to consciousness without consciousness knowing how this happens to it. It takes place for us,
as it were, behind the back of consciousness” (Ph ¶87) which seems to indicate a deficiency
in self-consciousness. Commentators consequently have avoided a genetic account self16
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consciousness (Cf. Honneth (2008), Neuhouser (1986)). Untying this interpretive knot is a
task that I believe the ‘tracking’ approach is competent to undertake, but whose detailed
justification I must leave for another paper. I only note that my strategy will turn on the
distinction between the movement of major shapes and minor shapes —while truth which
emerges for one minor shape is taken up dogmatically as the immediate mode of knowing for
the next minor shape, the major shapes of consciousness undergoing the more global
movement preserve their historical epistemic experience, and so, do accumulate an evolving
self-consciousness of their own dialectic (Cf. Ph ¶204, ¶237).

13

14

15

Note that I do not dismiss the possibility of using historical allegory as aids to
understanding and clarification in places where Hegel is abstruse. My intention here is only
to deny that what Hegel says, at least in the first two chapters of the Phenomenology, has
any direct empirical instances in any historical period.
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See for instance, Hegel’s remarks on language as mediation making what each opposing
shape of consciousness is “in itself into its spirit” at Ph ¶508-09. The role of the mediator or
the ‘mediating middle’ is no doubt inspired by the inference-facilitating role played by the
middle term in Aristotelian syllogism, though Luft (2013, p.314) warns us against a hasty
Aristotelian construal of the mediator.
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Thus, Hyppolite (1979, pp.207-17) sees this transition as grounded in and propelled by
alienation, specifically, the self-alienation of self-consciousness. Beiser (2005, pp. 136-39)
takes Hegel in this chapter to be advancing a critique of traditional Christianity that
alienates Man from God that withdraws from the world after the death of Christ, leaving no
direct mediators between the individual and God.
20 A.V. Miller, and commentators before and after him, translates Diener as ‘priest’ or
‘minister’. This matches the religious theme of this chapter, and the mediator has often been
thought to be a reference to the Church or any part thereof. I do not deny that Hegel perhaps
intended that allusion, but following Pinkard, I stick to the more neutral ‘mediator’ and
prefer a more heterodox and phenomenological interpretation. This is also in line with what
Hegel says in his Science of Logic taking mediation to be anything comprehended through
the categories (EL ¶62).
The concept of mediation is rich ( See O’Connor (1999, pp. 84-91) for his taxonomy of the
concept), and its reference to Kant is often noted in the literature—for instance, Houlgate
(2013, p. 118) compares it to the Kantian schema and Kain (2005, p. 63) compares it to Kant’s
use of God as mediator that reconciles virtue and happiness. It can however, I suspect, be
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anything that performs the function of mediation and unification at a higher cognitive level,
and that I think is the larger import of Hegel’s point over and above the religious references.
21 I presume this unity goes through successfully, and do not say how this unification
happens. I will note the consequences later though, given that this unity is achieved.
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Houlgate (2013) thinks that just because consciousness “cannot bring itself into contact
with the latter [the unchangeable essence], it must allow itself to be brought into contact with
it by another, by a mediator.” (p. 118, Houlgate’s emphasis) While this makes straightforward
logical sense, I contend that more is going on with the mediator’s introduction.
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According to Hegel, it is through the mediator’s counselling services that “consciousness
frees itself from [its own] doing” (Ph ¶228).
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See also Ph ¶210: “While the other unchangeable is a shape of singular individuality like
itself, consciousness becomes, thirdly, spirit. It has the joy of finding itself therein, and it is
aware that its singular individuality is reconciled with the universal.”
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This coheres with the advice that the mediator gives to the unhappy consciousness which
I succinctly reconstruct as: you must destroy the I by transferring your individuality to me
(c.f. Ph ¶228). The destruction of the I makes possible the reflective objective perspective that
comes from getting out of your own subjective point of view into an intersubjective form of
understanding and determining the self’s relation to the world.
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Not to mention that this, with the change in the meta-attitude that is to follow, is an
essential step towards Consciousness being “at home in oneself in one’s other” (EL ¶24)
27 Therefore, after the transition, when Reason says that all reality is for it, it means not just
all things, but also all other rational self-consciousness’ which had earlier provided resistance
in securing unity.
28 One reason could plausibly be the working of the category which I note at §3.2.
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C.f. Yovel’s (2005, p.100) remarks on love in his commentary on Hegel’s preface to the

Phenomenology.
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Cf. Houlgate (2003, p.375): “The experience that Hegel describes does not involve an
increase or a change in our empirical knowledge of the world [rather, it involves] a change in
the fundamental logical form of what it knows.”
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See Ph ¶233 where Hegel says that the truth that has emerged for Reason is: “what is, or
the in-itself, is only insofar as it is for consciousness, and that what is for consciousness is
also what is in itself.”
32 This unity is not to be construed as an identity of types or mere isomorphism in structure.
This is a deeper kind of unity. See footnote 35.
33 Note that if we’re tracking the movement and emergence of the dialectic of selfconsciousness, this event is nothing but the actualization of what Hegel says in the beginning
of the Self-Consciousness chapter, at the end of Ph ¶167: “Self-Consciousness exhibits itself
[ ] as the movement within which this opposition [of itself and the object] is sublated, and
within which, to itself, the equality of itself with itself comes to be.” (my emphasis). This
equality, however, is only formal. Reason’s reality is a universal, pure abstraction (Ph ¶235),
and subsequently, its claim is also abstract and empty (Ph ¶238).
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This theme continues from the dialectic of the mediator whose introduction was meant to
solve the problem of difference. Difference moves now from ‘difference from the other’ to
‘difference as inner difference, as difference within unity’. Cf. Kain (2005, p.65)
35 Having noted the shallowness of this claim at footnote 33, I want to now underscore the
depth of this point. Hegel at ¶233 says, “However, not only is self-consciousness for itself all
reality; it is also in itself all reality, as a result of its becoming this reality”. The unity of
subject-object means that the fundamental structure of reality has changed for
consciousness—it itself makes that reality, and awareness of it is awareness of itself and the
active meta-conceptual concepts at play. What will follow in the Reason chapter is a growing
self-consciousness of how it makes this reality, leading to the momentous realization that the
construction of reality is not an individual, but a shared or communal effort.
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See Ph ¶236: “we can no longer really talk of things at all”; Ph ¶237: “In the course of this
movement, it is to intuit the object as something to be sublated, to appropriate the object”
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Hence Hegel’s use of the adjective “unthinking” in the opening lines describing Observing
Reason at Ph ¶244. Cf. EL ¶63 where Hegel connects Reason with mediation and immediate
knowing.
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